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of 1990. A significant case was Boim
v. Holy Land Foundation, in which attorneys working on behalf of the family
of a U.S. victim of terrorism secured a
judgment against Islamic fund-raising
organizations, drying up a significant
source of material support to Hamas.
Kittrie concludes with a compelling
argument for a more creative and innovative integration of lawfare into
U.S. strategy. As he observes (p. 96),
the 2015 National Security Strategy
identifies security challenges that are
decentralized, transcend state borders,
involve nonstate actors, and “cannot
be neutralized using only deterrence
or the United States’ traditional kinetic toolbox.” Lawfare underscores
why strategists must have a practical
understanding of the entire spectrum of
factors affecting the strategic operating
environment—informational, cultural,
political, economic, social, and legal.
Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic
to expect strategists and policy makers
to be legal experts as well, so his conclusions include an analysis of the sources
of “lawfare power” and recommendations for leveraging the skills of the U.S.
legal community. To show how privatesector expertise can inform potential
military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes
how Special Operations Command
Pacific reached out to the University of
Pennsylvania’s law school for research on
foreign criminal laws that could be used
to detain and prosecute foreign fighters
supporting the Islamic State. In Kittrie’s
assessment (p. 32), if the United States
properly leverages its extensive legal
expertise to support a national lawfare
strategy, the “U.S. advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has the potential
to be even greater than its advantage
in sophisticated lethal weapons.”
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Lawfare reminds us that lethal force
is only one of many factors affecting
outcomes in war. Kittrie points the way
toward how legal factors can be used to
achieve practical effects. Military officers
and policy makers who read this book
will be rewarded with a better understanding of the legal dynamics that are
exerting an increasingly powerful influence on the legitimate use of violence.
KEVIN ROUSSEAU

Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II, by John M. Lillard. Lincoln: Potomac Books, Univ. of Nebraska Press,
2016. 224 pages. $39.95 (Kindle $26.37).

With the Navy’s recent efforts to reinvigorate war gaming, there has been
renewed interest in the interwar gaming
conducted at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. In the Naval
War College Review, Proceedings, and
other maritime journals, war-gaming
experts and enthusiasts alike have tried
to characterize the nature and value of
the Navy’s war games played between
1919 and 1941. John Lillard’s Playing
War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II is the latest
contribution to this resurgence. Seeking to provide a comprehensive study
of the interwar games conducted at the
College, Lillard intends to inform our
understanding of the “navy’s transition”
during this period. Playing War asserts
(p. 8) that the Newport games were
“transformational” and played a “central
role . . . in preparing the navy for war.”
For the most part, the author contributes
to the history of that era, but does so
with a work that would have benefited
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from additional editing and more attention to detail in its historiography.
This book succeeds with its analysis of
how the Newport war games evolved to
reflect the emergence of new technologies and operational thinking for the
Navy. Lillard organizes his analysis into
three phases: early (1919–27); middle
(1928–34); and late (1935–41). He
focuses on one or two College classes
within each of the phases, concentrating
on those of significant figures such as
Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold
Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and
Robert Ghormley. The author is at
his best when he analyzes the actual
games played and describes the relevant
insights recorded by the student-players
or the gaming faculty, or both. For example, his section on Tactical Game 94
of 1923 describes how that game demonstrated the importance of reconnaissance
and detection of the enemy’s forces first.
In his chapter on the middle phase, Lillard explains how the games explored
the innovations of air and undersea
warfare, pointing out that the players
learned more about aviation than they
did submarines. Lillard concedes that
the College games were not innovative
in themselves; instead he reinforces the
idea that “they were a common playing
field, a shared experience” for the men
who would fight the next war at sea.
Playing War is a useful complement to
Edward Miller’s War Plan Orange: The
U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1991) and Albert Nofi’s To Train the
Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940 (Newport, RI: Naval
War College Press, 2010). Lillard’s examination of the 1933 Van Auken report
is particularly effective at showing the
College’s contributions to the evolution
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of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet problems. Requested by College President
Admiral Harris Laning and written by
Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, head
of the newly created Research Department, the report summarized lessons
learned from all the Blue-Orange games
played between 1927 and 1933. The
author notes that Van Auken’s analysis
of the Trans Pacific problem presaged
the logistic challenges of the war and
the advent of the four hundred destroyer escorts that emerged during the
war. As War Plan ORANGE matured in
the 1930s, so too did the war gaming,
marked by the construction of Pringle
Hall and its famously square-tiled gaming floor. Lillard succinctly chronicles
Newport’s war-gaming transformation throughout the book’s narrative.
Readers familiar with the scholarship
that examines the U.S. Navy between
the two world wars will be distracted
by Lillard’s efforts to set his thesis apart
from the other literature. Playing War
looks and feels most similar to Michael
Vlahos’s The Blue Sword: The Naval
War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941 (Newport, RI: Naval
War College Press, 1980). Both of these
works are short in length, and have
appendices and tables that lay out the
war games played by each class. Lillard’s
book focuses more directly on the games
and the chronology of the College than
Vlahos’s monograph does. However, in
attempting to separate his research from
The Blue Sword, Lillard states (p. 10) that
Vlahos “did not use wargame records
from the Naval War College archives,”
which is not true. Making matters more
confusing, Lillard continues to refer
to Vlahos’s text throughout the book.
Later, Lillard asserts (p. 12) that John
Hattendorf, coauthor of Sailors and
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Scholars: The Centennial History of the
U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI:
Naval War College Press, 1984), is “a
former professor of naval history” whose
history of the College lacks “critical
analysis.” At the time of publication,
Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest
J. King Professor of Maritime History
at the Naval War College, and is still
recognized as the preeminent scholar on
the history of the U.S. Navy at Newport.
In addition to these two notable errors,
Playing War still reads like a dissertation in need of another round of editing.
Chapter introductions and descriptions
of the students are repeated several times
and add little to the analysis presented.
With the main body of the book ending
at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader
with the impression that there is still
more to explore about the relationship
between the interwar war games and
how the U.S. Navy fought during the
Second World War. While this imperfect
volume has some merit, the definitive
history of the Naval War College’s interwar war games remains to be written.
JON SCOTT LOGEL

Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain
System in Iraq and Afghanistan, ed. Montgomery
McFate and Janice H. Laurence. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320 pages. $39.95 (Kindle
$22.99).

The twenty-first-century security
environment has been characterized by
numerous cross-cultural battle spaces,
such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The U.S. Army initiated the human
terrain team (HTT) because it needed
to address the impact of the human
cultural dimension in the combat
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operational environment. The HTT’s
mission was to conduct research (in the
social sciences and anthropology) and
to advise military commanders about
the unique cultural aspects of the local/
regional population. In eleven chapters,
McFate and Laurence have compiled
an invaluable collection of experiences
from the scientists involved. They afford
us the opportunity to accompany these
scientists on their journeys, as they share
their perspectives with the military. We
learn the value of embedding social
scientists with military units and how
important their knowledge and expertise
are for military leaders to achieve an understanding of today’s complex, culturally diverse operational environments.
In this way, social scientists can help
military leaders make more-informed,
and therefore better, decisions.
General David Petraeus (Ret.) states
in the foreword that the “key terrain in irregular warfare is the human
terrain.” He highlights the role social
scientists played in shaping the cultural
framework of the battle space and how
they contributed to military leaders’
knowledge to ensure mission success.
General Petraeus posits the notion that
the military indeed may require even
greater sociocultural knowledge to
conduct future military operations.
Today’s military leaders are well trained
in tactics, techniques, and procedures;
however, the twenty-first-century
battle space presents inherent difficulties for military leaders. One of
their principal deficiencies is a lack of
cross-cultural competence (C3). C3 is
the ability to communicate effectively
and appropriately with people of other
cultures. As the number of multinational coalition military operations
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